

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 006679
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:MSTERNER:TH

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.

IO:GHELMAN (SUBS)

S/S: SGOLDSMITH

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 006679

NODIS

DELIVER TO AMB. EILTS BEFORE 0900 LOCAL JANUARY 11

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, IS, EG, US

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SADAT JAN. 11

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 339, (B) TEL AVIV 375, (C) CAIRO 871,
(D) CAIRO 922

1. FOR CAIRO: WE HAVE EXAMINED DAYAN'S COUNTERPROPOSALS FOR AGENDA OF JERUSALEM TALKS AND WHILE WE AGREE HE HAS MADE GENUINE EFFORT TO NARROW DIFFERENCES, WE QUESTION WHETHER THEY ADVANCE MATTERS SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED PRIOR TO JANUARY 16 IF PARTIES ARE LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES. AMONG OTHER PROBLEMS, DAYAN'S COUNTERPROPOSAL ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO EGYPTIANS AS PRESENTLY WORDED, NOR DOES COUNTERPROPOSAL

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CONTAIN ANYTHING ON WITHDRAWAL WHICH EGYPTIANS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY INSIST UPON. RECONCILIATION OF TWO PROPOSALS, IF POSSIBLE AT ALL, WOULD BE TIME-CONSUMING AND AS WE SAID IN OUR PREVIOUS MESSAGE WE SEE LITTLE PROFIT IN PROLONGED NEGOTIATION OVER AGENDA. CONCLUSION WE DRAW IS THAT IN END WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO STEP IN WITH OUR OWN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL IF AGENDA IS TO BE AGREED UPON BEFORE COMMITTEE

CONVENES.

2. BEGIN HAS IN EFFECT ASKED US (TEL AVIV 3,5) NOT TO

PRE-EMPT ISRAELI COUNTERPROPOSALS BY SUBMITTING OUR OWN SUGGESTIONS BEFORE WE HAVE RECEIVED EGYPTIAN REACTION TO THEIRS. AT SAME TIME WE AGREE WITH YOU, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM WE HAVE WITH SADAT IN ASWAN, THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE OPPORTUNITY OF YOUR MEETING WITH SADAT TODAY TO CONVEY OUR IDEA FOR COMPROMISE WORDING. BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD ELICIT SADAT'S REACTION TO DAYAN'S PROPOSALS WHICH YOU CONVEYED TO KAMEL JANUARY 10. UNLESS HIS REACTION IS POSITIVE, OR HE ADVANCES COUNTERPROPOSALS WHICH IN YOUR JUDGMENT MAKE RECONCILIATION WITH DAYAN'S LATEST OFFER SIMPLE AND EXPEDITIOUS MATTER, YOU SHOULD PRESENT OUR IDEAS TO SADAT AS CONTAINED STATE 5218. PLEASE STRESS OUR VIEW THAT AGENDA IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PLACE FOR TWO SIDES TO BE TRYING TO GAIN ADVANTAGE BY INCORPORATING THEIR FAVORITE PHRASEOLOGY. IN PUTTING FORTH OUR SUGGESTION FOR COMPROMISE WE HAVE SOUGHT TO STATE AGENDA ITEMS IN AS SIMPLE AND NEUTRAL MANNER AS POSSIBLE. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL FOR BOTH SIDES TO APPROACH PROBLEM IN THIS WAY IF FRUITLESS ARGUMENT OVER AGENDA IS TO BE AVOIDED.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TAKE OPPORTUNITY OF YOUR CONVERSATION
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WITH SADAT TO INFORM HIM OF OUR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE UN SYG WALDHEIM TO SEND REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND JERUSALEM TALKS. WALDHEIM TELEPHONED SECRETARY JANUARY 10 FROM TEHRAN REITERATING DIFFICULTIES WHICH IN HIS VIEW HE WOULD FACE IF HE WERE TO TAKE THIS STEP. HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT CRITICISM HE BELIEVES HE WOULD GET FROM SOVIETS AND CERTAIN ARABS AND ABOUT RISK OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IF HE WERE TO DECIDE TO SEND REPRESENTATIVE. SECRETARY REITERATED OUR POSITION, ALREADY CONVEYED EARLIER TO WALDHEIM, THAT WE BELIEVE UN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT JERUSALEM TALKS, NOTING THAT PURPOSE OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE TALKS NO LESS THAN CAIRO CONFERENCE ITSELF IS TO PREPARE FOR COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING AT SOME POINT TO GENEVA AND THAT THEREFORE SYMBOLISM OF UN REPRESENTATION IN THESE PROCEEDINGS WAS IMPORTANT. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER WALDHEIM WILL CHANGE HIS MIND, BUT WE WANTED SADAT TO KNOW WE TRIED. WE UNDERSTAND ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO URGED THAT WALDHEIM SEND REPRESENTATIVE TO JERUSALEM.

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE YOU SHOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, BUT IF SADAT RAISES IT, YOU SHOULD USE FOLLOWING AS GUIDANCE: WE HAVE ON NUMEROUS

OCCASIONS EXPRESSED U.S. GOVERNMENT'S DISAPPROVAL OF, AND
OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN
OCCUPIED TERRITORY. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TAKEN A RELATIVELY
LOW-KEY.

STAND PUBLICLY BECAUSE W" DO NOT THINK ACRIMONIOUS PUBLIC
DEBATE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OR TO
OUR ABILITY TO PLAY ACTIVE ROLE IN JERUSALEM TALKS, THE
PRESIDENT HAS PRIVATELY WEIGHED IN VERY STRONGLY WITH
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ABOUT RECENT ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF AND ARE GRATIFIED BY
THE STATESMANLIKE RESTRAINT EXERCISED BY PRESIDENT SADAT
IN DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT.

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5. FOR TEL AVIV: WITH RESPECT TO AGENDA, YOU SHOULD
INFORM BEGIN THAT INITIAL EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY RE-
ACTION TO DAYAN'S COUNTERPROPOSALS WAS NOT ENCOURAGING.
TELL HIM EILTS IS TRAVELLING TO ASWAN AND WILL TRY THEM
OUT ON SADAT DIRECTLY. IF SADAT'S REACTION INDICATES
THAT RECONCILIATION OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI AGENDA
PROPOSALS IS UNLIKELY OR WILL BE DRAWN-OUT AFFAIR, WE
HAVE AUTHORIZED EILTS--GIVEN SHORTNESS OF TIME BEFORE
JANUARY 16 AND DIFFICULTY OF FURTHER RAPID COMMUNICATION
WITH SADAT IN ASWAN--TO PUT OUR PROPOSED COMPROMISE
AG:NDA TO SADAT AT THAT TIME.

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APPROVED BY:S/S-O:SGOLDSMITH

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 006679

NODIS
FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 6679 ACTION CAIRO AND TEL AVIV JAN 10.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 006679

NODIS
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UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, PALESTINIANS, MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, PEACE TALKS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE006679
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: MSTERNER:TH
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840148-2286
Format: TEL
From: STATE NEA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Line Count: 301
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Litigation History:
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Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 TEL AVIV 339, 78 TEL AVIV 375, 78 CAIRO 871, 78 CAIRO 922
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3797729
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SADAT JAN. 11
TAGS: PGOV, IS, EG, US, (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: CAIRO TEL AVIV
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b99deae4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014